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Summary findings
The Egyptian food subsidy system is an untargeted  welfare status of the urban poor. But in rural Egypt
system that is essentially open to all Egyptians. For this  where the poor  do not consume so much baladi bread,
reason, the budgetary costs of this system have been high  the poor  receive less in income transfers than the rich.
and the ability of this system to improve the welfare  In many countries, administrative targeting of food
status of the poor has been questioned.  subsidies can do a better job of targeting the poor than
Since the food riots of 1977, Egyptian policymakers  self-targeting systems. In Jamaica, for example, poor
have been reluctant to make large changes in their food  people get food stamps at health clinics, so the Jamaican
subsidy system. Rather, their strategy has been to reduce  poor  receive double the income transfers from food
the costs and coverage of this system gradually. For  subsidies that the Egyptian poor receive. But starting a
example, since 1980 policymakers have reduced the  comparable system in Egypt would be costly both in
number of subsidized foods from 20 to just four.  financial and political terms, because many nonpoor
Despite these cutbacks, Adams uses new 1997  households currently receiving food subsidies would have
household survey data to show that the Egyptian food  to be excluded.
subsidy  system  is self-targeted  to the  poor,  because  it  For  these  reasons,  it is likely that  the government  will
subsidizes "inferior" goods. In urban Egypt, for instance,  continue to refine the present food subsidy system,
the main  subsidized  food  - coarse  baladi  bread  - is  perhaps  by eliminating  current  subsidies  on  sugar  or
consumed more by the poor  (the lowest quintile group of  edible oil. Neither of these foods is an "inferior"  good,
the population) than by the rich (the highest quintile). So  so eliminating these subsidies will have only a minimal
subsidizing baladi bread is a good way of improving the  impact on the welfare status of the poor.
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1. Introduction
Food subsidy programs are under increasing criticism in many developing
countries because of their large contributions to government budget deficits.  According
to critics, food subsidies pose both an unnecessary burden on the public budget and are
economically inefficient because their benefits are often not received by the poor.'  These
critics argue that because of improper targeting, a large part of food subsidies is "leaked"
to high-income people.
Proponents of food subsidies argue, however, that such programs are necessary to
"guarantee" the supply of basic foods to the poor. Proponents claim that since the poor
spend higher proportions of their income on food than do the rich, food subsidies are
needed.  to protect the welfare and nutritional status of the economically disadvantaged.
How niuch do food subsidies affect the incomes and nutritional status of the poor?
What proportion of food subsidies are leaked tc non-needy groups, such as high-income
consumners'?  What are the political issues involved in trying to reform food subsidy
programs?  This paper proposes to analyze these, and similar, issues within the context of
Egypt.
Egypt represents an ideal country for examining such issues because it has had a
large food subsidy program dating back to World War RI. By 1980 this subsidy system
had expancled  to include almost 20 foods and to account for about 15 percent of total
governmenrt  expenditures.  Since that time budgetary pressures have forced a considerable2
"downsizing" of the food subsidy program.  At present, the Egyptian subsidy system only
includes four foods - coarse baladi bread,2 coarse baladi wheat flour, edible oil and sugar
- and accounts for less than 6 percent of total government expenditures.  The coarse
baladi bread is sold to consumers without quantity restrictions by private sector bakeries,
the coarse wheat flour is sold by government warehouses, and edible oil and sugar are
sold at fixed monthly quotas by private groceries.
In theory, subsidizing cheap, "calorie-dense" foods like coarse bread and coarse
wheat flour should help protect the income and nutritional status of the poor in Egypt. In
practice, however, since the Egyptian food subsidy system is a general, untargeted one
that is virtually open to all Egyptians, the benefits of this system are in much dispute. For
instance, while critics charge that the system is plagued by large amounts of leakage to
non-needy groups, government policymakers are often reluctant to reform the systern for
fear of political unrest.
This paper extends an earlier study by the author in order to shed new light on the
political and distributional impact of Egyptian food subsidies. 3 It is divided as follows.
To provide a broader context, Section 2 presents an overview of the role of food subsidies
in developing countries.  Section 3 then reviews the history and operation of the food
subsidy system in Egypt, paying particular attention to the 1977 food riots.  Section 4
presents the details from a new, 1997 household budget survey in Egypt. This sunrey,
which collected heretofore unavailable expenditure data on each type of subsidized food
in Egypt, makes it possible to pinpoint the current distributional impact of food subsidies.
Sections 5 and 6 use these new survey data to analyze the impact of each subsidized food3
on different income groups in urban and rural areas. Section 7 presents some possible
options for reforming Egyptian food subsidies, and section 8 concludes.
2.  Role of Food Subsidies in Developing Countries
In the developing world food subsidy programs are used to sell and/or make
available certain food items to consumers at below-market prices.  These programs can be
used to pursue a variety of objectives. In some countries food subsidies are designed as a
form of partial wage compensation to public sector employees, including military
personnel.  In other countries food subsidies are used to try to improve the nutritional
level of certain "at risk" groups, like pregnant mothers or school children.  Finally, in
some countries food subsidies are used to raise the income and nutritional status of larger
- and perhaps more  ill-defined groups - such as the poor.4
A key to the effectiveness of all these programs is the degree to which they are
able to deliver subsidized food to their intended target group (i.e. pregnant mothers, the
poor, etc).  Indeed.,  the whole notion of targeting requires some sort of mechanism by
which the general population can be "screened" in order to determnine  which individuals
should receive food subsidies, and which individuals should not.
In mosl general terms, the screening of individuals can occur in one of two ways:
either through administrative targeting or through self-targeting. The first alternative -
administrative targeting - typically uses some government agency or bureaucracy to
select the beneficiaries of food subsidies.  For example, government agencies sometimes
select beneficiaries on the basis of income.  However, in many developing countries it is
often quite difficult to screen individuals on this basis because accurate income data are4
unavailable for those households which are working in agriculture or the informal sector.
For this reason, other indicators which correlate with income - such as area of residence -
are sometimes used to select beneficiaries.  Such geographic targeting has the advantage
of requiring relatively little administration, but it is often not well-designed for reaching
target populations.  For example, a food subsidy program working in one area of the
country will never be able to reach pregnant women or the poor in another region of the
country.
Self-targeting represents a second way of selecting the beneficiaries for food
subsidy programs.  Self-targeting occurs when food subsidies are available to all, but the
program is designed so that only the targeted population elects to participate.  Self-
targeting works best when the targeted population - for example, the poor - consume
different food items than the general population.  For instance, in Bangladesh a subsidy
on wheat can be self-targeted to the poor, since the poor tend to consume more wheat
than the non-poor, who prefer rice. 5
Since the Egyptian food subsidy program uses self-targeting - rather than
administrative means - to select beneficiaries, more needs to be said about the principle
of self-targeting.
Food subsidies can be considered to be self-targeted when the subsidized ite:m  is
an inferior good;6 that is, the food is consumed more in both absolute and relative terms
by the poor than by the non-poor.  Practically speaking, however, it is difficult to find
food items which are consumed more in both absolute and relative terms by the poor than
by the rich. In other words, while the poor may spend relatively more of their budgets on
certain foods than the rich, since the rich spend more in absolute terms on food, it is5
difficult to fincd  specific food items on which the poor spend more in absolute terms than
the rich. Other than thLe  wheat versus rice case in Bangladesh (and other Asian countries),
the most comrmon  exception to this "rule" comes when different qualities of the same
food commodity can be found. For instance, a recent study in Tunisia found that while
the rich spend more in absolute and relative terms on subsidized bread, the poor spend
more in absolute and relative terms on subsidized coarse bread.7 In other words, if the
goal is to self-target food subsidies to the poor, then the choice of commodity to subsidize
is very important.
3 (a). History of the Food Subsidy System in Egypt
The current food subsidy system in Egypt has its origins in World War II. In 1941
the Egyptian government introduced food rationing in order to provide certain necessities
- edible oil, sugar, tea and kerosene - to consumers at relatively low prices. This
rationing program was not designed to provide low-priced food to the poor.
During the 1950s and 1960s the total cost of this food subsidy system remained
small.  During the 197'0s,  however, the system was extended to include additional foods,
such as beans, lentils, frozen fish, frozen meat and chicken. 8 By 1980 the subsidy system
included almost 20 foods, most of which were available on a monthly quota basis to all
Egyptians who had ration cards.  Since the overwhelming majority of the population had
ration cards, subsidized foods were essentially available to all Egyptians.
As a result of these changes, the cost of Egyptian food subsidies ballooned.  By
1975 food subsidies accounted for 16.9 percent of total government expenditures (Table
1).6
It should, however, be recognized that food subsidies have never accounted for
the sum total of subsidies in Egypt. Since the early 1970s food subsidies in Egypt have
represented part of a much larger consumer welfare program that subsidizes water,
electricity, transportation and oil. This larger consumer welfare program, which is not
targeted to the poor, includes both explicit subsidies - for items like food - and implicit
subsidies - for items like water and electricity.
In Egypt implicit subsidies are not listed in the official government budget and are
never included in the figures that are listed for subsidies. 9 This makes it very difficult to
calculate the size of these subsidies. For example, in Egypt implicit subsidies on water
and electricity represent the losses incurred by the public sector companies that sell these
services to the public.  In other words, when these companies sell water and electricity at
less than the cost of production, these losses are listed on the accounts of the public sector
companies but not on the government budget.
Table 2 represents an attempt to use incomplete data to estimate the total
costs of explicit and implicit subsidies in Egypt. Even with fragmentary data, the table
shows that the total value of implicit subsidies - on non-food items like water and
electricity - is quite high.  For example, in the year 1993/94, the total value of implicit
subsidies (LE 3,950 million) is much higher than that for food subsidies (LE 2,486
million).  Moreover, it should be noted that the estimates for implicit subsidies on wiater
and electricity in Table 2 cover only those subsidies given to urban - and not rural --
consumers.  Thus, the actual value of implicit subsidies on water and electricity is
probably three to four times higher than reported.7
Food subsicies, however, have always tended to attract more attention than other
types of subsidies in Egypt. The reason for this is that food subsidies have always been
explicit and listed as a line item in the government budget because much of the
subsidized food - that is wheat and wheat flour - has been imported.  For example,
during the 1980s the average annual cost of wheat and wheat flour imports into Egypt
was US $1,188 million.  Because of recent increases in Egyptian wheat production, in the
1990s the average annual cost of such imports has fallen to US $800 million.
Nevertheless, E,gyplt  still remains the world's third largest wheat and wheat flour
importer, after China and Russia.
Partly as a resuilt  of its wheat imports, Egypt's tiade balance and current account
have been in deficit in most years.  To meet this situation, Egypt has been forced to
borrow from albroad. Between 1975 and 1993 Egypt's total external debt increased more
than eight-fold: from US $4,828 to $40,626 million.
As Egypt's external debts rose, it was forced to try to reschedule debt payments by
entering into negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Unlike Latin
American debtors, Egypt has not borrowed heavily from commercial banks.  Most of its
external debt is on concessionary terms, consisting of long-term loans from governments
and international institutions.  Nevertheless, in order to satisfy creditors, Egypt reached
stand-by agreements wvith  the IMF in 1977, 1987  and 1  991.10 Each of these agreements
called upon the Egyptian government to reduce public expenditures by cutting back on
subsidies, salaries to government and public sector woikers, and investment in public
sector firms.8
3 (b). External Debt. Food Subsidies and the 1977 Riots
In 1977, during the months before Egypt's first stand-by agreement with the IMF,
Egypt's total external debt stood at over US $5.7 billion (42 percent of gross national
product).  Some of this debt came from rolling over the short-term loans that had been
used to finance food imports prior to 1974 when food aid increased.  Not only was
Egypt's foreign indebtedness high, but in the mid-1970s traditional creditors were balking
at giving further loans until the government took immediate steps to reduce public
expenditures.  For instance, in late 1976 the Gulf Organization for the Development of
Egypt, a consortium of Arab countries, refused to grant a loan of US $1.0 billion to fund
Egypt's balance-of-payments deficit.
To meet this situation, Egyptian policymakers decided to reduce expenditures by
cutting subsidies.  According to Dr. Hamed Latif el-Sayeh, Minister of Economy and
Economic Cooperation:
(In 1976) we had a government budget deficit of over US $2.0 billion.  When we
came into the (Egyptian) Cabinet, we decided that this must be reduced.  There are four
major items in the budget:  military, investment, subsidies and debt service.  Should we
cut back on our military?  You can't do that.  Investment? That's growth and without
growth Egypt cannot live....  Debt service?  We have more than $2.5 billion in medium-
and long-range debt.  You can't touch that.  . . . (So the only thing left) is subsidies.  A
few years ago we started with bread subsidies. Then we went into all kinds of things.
The subsidies went from US $175 million four years ago to US $1.7 billion.  This is why
we moved immediately, and without thinking politically, I guess, to reduce subsidies.
The problem was it was a bad strategy. We are not trained politicians.  We did not
anticipate any trouble.  We told the International Monetary Fund there would be no
trouble (reducing subsidies)."
Based on this thinking, the Egyptian cabinet on January 19,1977 announced
immediate price increases for a number of subsidized foods:  fino bread (72 percent
extraction), 12 refined flour, rationed sugar, rationed rice and tea.  Prices for other9
subsidized foods, including coarse baladi bread (82 percent extraction), rationed sugar
and edible oil were not affected by this announcement. HIowever,  the announcement also
raised prices for some subsidized non-food commodities:  butagas, gasoline and
cigarettes.
The popular response to these price increases was immediate.  On January 20,
1977 rioting erupted throughout Egypt. Police precincts were besieged, shops and
nightclubs were looted, and in Cairo alone 77 people were killed.
As a result of these disturbances, all the price increases were rescinded.  Within a
week, the International Monetary Fund, anxious to restore stability to Egypt, announced a
US $140 million loan to Egypt.
The events of January 1977 seared the consciousness of policymakers.  Since that
time no Egyptian policymaker has tried to eliminate food subsidies in one fell swoop.
Instead, the strategy has been to reduce the cost of food subsidies gradually and without
much fanfare.  Three aspects of this strategy merit particular attention.
First, since 1977 the Egyptian government has slowly, but deliberately, reduced
the number of subsidized foods. For instance, as mentioned above, in 1980 the subsidy
system includeid  alrnost 20 foods, including such high-income elasticity foods as frozen
meat, eggs and chicken.'3 With the exception of subsidized bread, which was sold
without quantity restrictions, most of these subsidized food items were available on a
monthly quota basis to all Egyptians who held ration cards.  Since over 90 percent of the
Egyptian population had ration cards, subsidized foods were essentially available to
everyone. However, once the memory of the 1977 food riots began to fade, the Egyptian
government began to slowly, but steadily, eliminate foods from the subsidy system.  For10
instance, the subsidy on frozen meat was removed in 1990/91, the subsidies on fish and
tea in 1991/92 and that on rice in 1992/93. By 1996/97 only four food items remained
subsidized:  coarse baladi bread, coarse baladi wheat flour, sugar and edible oil.
Second, since the events of January 1977 Egyptian policymakers have tried to
reduce the number of people who held ration cards and were thus eligible for food
subsidies.  In 1981 and again in 1994 the Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Supply redtuced
the number of  ration card holders by canceling the names of people who were either
abroad or deceased.  In 1989 the Ministry of Trade and Supply also stopped registering
new-born children into the system. Despite these changes, the number of ration book
holders declined only slightly, reaching 78 percent of the total Egyptian population in
1994.14
In another effort to reduce eligibility, in 1981 the Ministry of Trade and Supply
divided all ration book holders into two categories:  fully subsidized (green books) and
partially subsidized (red books). People in high-income professions - such as investors,
owners of shops or buildings or cars, and landowners with more than 10 feddans'5 -- D  were
all assigned to the partially subsidized program. Despite these efforts, the number of
participants in the partially subsidized group remained very small.  For example, by 1994
less than 3 percent of the total Egyptian population belonged to the partially subsidized
group.
Third, Egyptian policymakers have handled subsidy reductions on the most
important food item - bread - with much care.  Such a strategy makes good sense in a
country where bread (and wheat flour) account for 42 percent of total daily calorie
consumption in urban areas.'611
There are three basic types of bread in Egypt: a c;oarse,  brown loaf called baladi
(82 percent extraction); a whiter loaf called shami (76 percent extraction); and finally a
longer loaf resembling French bread called fino (72 perccnt extraction).  After thirty years
of no price increases for bread, the price for all three types of subsidized bread was
increased from LE 0.01 to LE 0.02 a loaf in 1983/84. Agcain,  in 1988/89 the prices for all
these breads was increased from LE 0.02 to LE 0.05.  Without any announcement,
Egyptian decision makers also began decreasing the weight of subsidized bread:  from
150 to 130 grams per loaf.  At the same time, Egyptian policymakers began engaging in
"quality differentiation" by allowing the free market to produce and sell larger, higher-
quality loaves of unsubsidized shami and fino bread. The sale of these higher quality
breads tended to attract the demand of wealthier households, while leaving the lower-
quality, subsidized bread for purchase by the poor. Finally, in 1992 the government
stopped subsidizing the highest quality bread - fino bread (72 percent extraction).  And
four years later.,  in July 1996 the government stopped subsidizing the sale of shami bread
(76 percent extraction).
Egyptian policymakers achieved all of these bread price increases without any
repetition of the 1977 riots.  One important reason for this success lies in the fact that
baladi bread - the mnain  bread in Egypt'7 -- is still heavily subsidized.  In 1996/97 baladi
bread sold at LE 0.05 per loaf, while the actual average cost of such a loaf was LE 0.121.
Given the size of this subsidy, it is no wonder that baladi bread and baladi wheat flour
have come to dominate the costs of the food subsidy system, accounting for about 60
percent of the total cost of Egyptian food subsidies in recent years (Table 1).12
4.  New 1997 Household Budget Survey
In 1996 the author published a study analyzing the distributional impact of the
Egyptian food subsidy system.'8 This study used expenditure data from the 1990/91
Household and Income Expenditure Survey (HIES), which was a large, nationally-
representative survey conducted by the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization
and Statistics (CAPMAS).1 9 One of the main problems with this 1990/91 HIES survey
was that it did not collect expenditure data on different kinds of subsidized and
nonsubsidized foods. For example, the 1990/91 survey did not collect data on the level of
expenditures on subsidized bread (like baladi bread) as opposed to nonsubsidized bread
(like fino bread).  This made it difficult to pinpoint the distributional effects of subsidized
foods on different income groups in the Egyptian population.
To remedy this data deficiency, in 1997 the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI), together with the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and the Egyptian
Ministry of Trade and Supply, carried out a new household survey. This new survey -- the
Egypt Integrated Household Survey (EIHS) -- was designed to collect detailed
expenditure data on all of the main subsidized and non-subsidized foods in Egypt. The
survey was a single-round, nationally-representative survey that included about 2,500
urban and rural households from 20 different governorates. The sample frame used for
selecting households was supplied by CAPMAS from its 1990/91 HIES survey. 20
The balance of this paper uses data from the 1997 LFPRI  survey to evaluate the
distributional impact of Egyptian food subsidies.  To do this, several key calculations are
made. First, per capita total expenditure is calculated from the IFPRI survey data for each
household. 21 The measure of total expenditure used is quite comprehensive, and includes:13
total food expenses, total nonfood non-durable good expenses, estimated use value of
durable goods and an actual or imputed rental value of housing.22 Second, data from the
IFPRI sl:udy  are used to calculate weekly food expenditures by individual food - both
subsidized and nonsubsidized - for each household.
This paper disaggregates the population of the 1997 IFPRI sample into quintile
groups, which are based on population quintiles ranked by total per capita expenditures.
Since an important par; of this analysis focuses on the nutritional benefits received by
different expenditure quintile groups, it should be noted that a potential bias arises when
the same informaticn on calorie availability (from food expenditures) is used to classify
households by expenditure level (food plus nonfood expenditures).  For example,
households that randormly  overestimate food expenditures will also overestimate calorie
availability and will tend to be filtered towards the top expenditure quintile groups.  As a
result, the gap in calorie availability (calorie supply) between high and low expenditure
23 quintile groups can be grossly overstated.
To avoid such potential bias, this paper calculates a "fitted" total expenditure per
capita variable for each household by:  (1) regressing ncnfood expenditures, household
size, and dummny  variables for five different geographic regions on food expenditure; 24
(2) calculating "fitted" food expenditures from the regression coefficients; and (3) adding
"fitted" food expenditures to observed nonfood expenditures.25 In the analysis fitted total
expenditures were then used to classify the population by expenditure quintile, separately
for urban and rural Egypt.  26
Throughout the analysis the population belonging to the lowest expenditure
quintile group are considered to be "poor," and those belonging to the highest quintile14
group are considered to be "rich."  Also, since the distributional impact of food subsidies
is different in urban and rural Egypt, the analysis will be divided into urban and rural
areas.
5.  Distributional Impact of Egyptian Food Subsidies:  Urban Areas
From a distributional standpoint, it is best if a general food subsidy program -- like
the one in Egypt - can subsidize those foods which are consumed more in absolute and
relative terms by the poor than by the rich.  A general food subsidy program can be called
self-targeted if it subsidizes inferior foods whose consumption declines with income
because wealthier households prefer higher quality, nonsubsidized foods.
Table 3 suggests that in urban areas the Egyptian food subsidy system is self-
targeted in the sense that the poor tend to participate more than the rich.  In urban areas
the poorest expenditure quintile group (20 percent of the population) spends 20.8 percent
of its total expenditures on subsidized food, while the top quintile group (20 percenit  of
the population) spends 16.8 percent of its expenditures on subsidized food.  In absolute
terms, the poorest quintile group spends about 1.2 times more on subsidized food th,an  the
top group.
The results in Table 3 are driven by those for baladi bread.  Not only does the
mean per capita level of expenditures on baladi bread decline sharply with income, but
the difference in mean expenditures on baladi bread between the lowest and highest
quintile groups is statistically significant. By contrast, expenditure levels for the other
three subsidized foods show little variation across income group.  All of this suggests that
for urban areas, baladi bread has the characteristics of an inferior good. The other three15
subsidized foods - baladi wheat flour, edible oil and sugar - are not inferior goods in
urban Egypt.
While the results of Table 3 are suggestive, they do not "prove" that the Egyptian
food subsidy system is self-targeted to the urban poor.  Since the rate of subsidy usually
varies by type of food, it is important to consider the actual income transfer going to
different income groups from each subsidized food.  The amount of income transfer from
each subsidized fooid  can be defined as the difference betiween  what a household pays for
that subsidized food, and what they would have to pay for that food in the "free market"
in the absence of food subsidies.
Unfortunately, iin  Egypt it is not easy to establish the amount of income transfer
going to consurners from different subsidized foods. The principal ministry in Egypt -
the Ministry of Tracle and Supply - keeps no detailed records on the rate of subsidy for
subsidized foocds. In the absence of any established "free market" prices for subsidized
foods in Egypt, it is therefore necessary to calculate equivalent border prices for each
subsidized item.  This is a sensible approach, because much of the subsidized food in
27 Egypt is imported.
To calculate equivalent border prices, it is necessary to start with the CIF import
prices for each subsidized food, and then add in estimated costs of handling,
transportation, retailing and - in the case of baladi bread - milling and baking expenses.
Unfortunately, this procedure does not include any of the costs for administering food
subsidies in Egypt, because these administrative costs a,re  unknown.  However, since it
can be assumed that administrative costs would be roughly equal for each of the four
subsidized foods, omitting these costs probably just gives a slight downward bias to the16
calculated rate of subsidy for each food.  In any event, following the above procedures
suggests that in 1996/97 the rate of subsidy (defined as the amount of income transfer
divided by the "free market," nonsubsidized price) was: 59 percent for subsidized baladi
bread, 47 percent for subsidized baladi wheat flour, 56 percent for edible oil and 62
percent for sugar.28 Table 4 shows how these rates of subsidy have varied in recent years
for the four foods, and Appendix Table 1 provides details on how the rate of subsidy was
calculated for the most important subsidized food:  baladi bread.
Using these estimated rates of subsidy, Table 5 shows the distribution of income
transfers to urban consumers from each subsidized food. The results show that food
subsidies are self-targeted to the poor in urban areas because income transfers - on the
whole -- decline with income.  In absolute terms, while the lowest quintile group receives
LE 1.83 per capita per week from subsidized food, and the third quintile group receives
LE 1.96, the top quintile group receives the smallest amount in the table:  LE 1.60.
As in Table 3, these results are driven by the distribution of income transfers from
one food:  baladi bread.  Not only does baladi bread account for 74 percent of the total
income transfers to the poor from subsidized foods in Table 5, but the level of income
transfers from baladi bread declines sharply with income group and is significantly
different between the lowest and highest quintile groups. By contrast, the amount of
income transfer from each of the other subsidized foods shows little variation with
income.
In relative terms, the poor in urban areas are also gaining more from income
transfers than the rich.  According to Table 5, total income transfers from subsidized food17
as a share of total expenditures decline monotonically with income:  from 8.7 percent for
the poor to 1.4 percent for the rich.
Table 6 shows the distribution of calorie availability from subsidized food in
urban areas. 29 Of the four subsidized foods, baladi bread is by far the most important
source of calories, providing 33 percent of total calcirie availability for the lowest quintile
group and  [8 percent for the top quintile group.  On the whole, the four subsidized foods
represent a  major part of the diet of the urban poor, accounting for almost 44 percent of
total calorie supply for the lowest quintile group.
6.  Distributional impact of Egyptian food subsidies: Rural areas
Table 7 shows the distribution of expenditures on subsidized food by quintile
group for rural areas.  At first glance, food subsidies in rural Egypt do not seem to be as
well targeted tc the poor as in urban Egypt. In rural areas the poorest quintile group
spends 19.5 percent of its total expenditures on subsidized foods while the top quintile
group spends a slightly larger share -- 21 percent.  These results seem to be driven by
those for baladii  bread.  While in rural areas the mean per capita level of expenditures on
subsidized baladi bread increases slightly with incorme,  in urban areas it falls sharply with
income (see Table 3).
Baladi bread has a different distributional impact in rural as opposed to urban
areas becauise  the rural poor tend to buy subsidized baladi wheat flour rather than
subsidized baladi bread. 30 The rural poor use this baladi flour to bake their own bread.
As a result, Table 7 shows that the mean per capita level of expenditures on baladi wheat18
flour declines steadily with income.  This suggests that in rural Egypt baladi wheat flour -
and not baladi bread - has the characteristics of an inferior good.
There are two possible reasons for this difference in bread consumption patterns
between urban and rural areas. First, in the countryside, the poor may have less access to
bakeries than their counterparts in urban areas. For example, in rural Egypt bakeries tend
to be located in towns and larger villages, and thus poor people living outside of these
areas have less access to subsidized baladi bread.  Second, throughout Egypt bread-
baking is a female task.  In rural areas, because of the twin influences of social tradition
and reduced employment opportunities for women, it is likely that women have more
time to bake and prepare bread.  In rural Upper Egypt, for example, women - even poor
women - typically do not accept paid employment outside the home and so would have
more time than their urban counterparts to use subsidized baladi wheat flour to bake their
31 own bread.
Table 8 shows that in terms of income transfers the food subsidy system in rural
Egypt is also not as well targeted to the poor as that in urban Egypt.  In absolute terms,
while the lowest quintile group receives LE 1.62 per capita per week from subsidized
foods, the top quintile group receives LE 1.86. In rural Egypt the only subsidized food
that transfers more income to the poor rather than to the rich is baladi wheat flour.
According to Table 8, the level of income transfers from subsidized baladi wheat flour
falls from LE 0.64 per capita per week for the lowest income group to LE  0.46 for the
highest income group. This difference in income transfers from subsidized baladi wheat
flour between the lowest and highest quintile groups is statistically significant.19
While ini  absolute terms the rural poor may not be gaining as much as the rural
rich from subsidized food, Table 8 shows that when the data are expressed in relative
terms the picture is more encouraging.  In rural Egypt, total income transfers from
subsidized food.  as a share of total expenditures are both higher than those in urban areas
and these transfers decline monotonically with income.  Since rural households are on
average poorer than those in urban areas, 32 they speiid a larger proportion of their
incomes or food in general and subsidized food in lparticular. However, in both rural and
urban areas, as incomes rise, the proportion spent oII  both food and subsidized food
declines.
Table 9 shows the distribution of calorie availability from subsidized food in rural
areas. Two items are important here. First, unlike urban areas, baladi bread is no longer
the single most dominant source of calorie availability. Because rural people tend to bake
their own bread, baladi bread and  baladi wheat flour are both important sources of
calories: each account for about 16 percent of total calorie availability for the lowest
quintile group.  Second, because the food subsidy system is not as well targeted in rural
areas, Table 9 shows that rich actually receive more calories from subsidized food than do
the poor.  In absolute terms, the highest quintile receives 1,195 calories from subsidized
food, as opposed to 1,089 calories for those in the lowest quintile group. The reason for
this seems to be that - unlike urban areas - the rich in rural areas are deriving more
calories from subsidized baladi bread than the poor.20
7.  Options for Reforming the Egyptian Food Subsidy System
It is possible to compare the distribution of income transfers from the Egyptian
food subsidy program with those of other countries.  Table 10 (a) does this by comparing
various food subsidy programs which use self-targeting to reach the poor.  In Egypt the
lowest quintile group receives about the same proportion of total income transfers from
subsidized food (19 to 20 percent) as do those in the lowest quintile group in self-targeted
programs in Tunisia and Morocco.
However, food subsidy programs which use administrative targeting and/or
means-testing can do an even better job of delivering food subsidy benefits to the poor.
For example, Table 10 (b) shows that the Jamaican food subsidy program, which uses
administrative targeting to distribute food stamps at health clinics, delivers 44 percent of
total income transfers to the lowest quintile group.  The Jamaican program does a better
job at delivering income transfers to the poor for three reasons:  (1) it uses a government
agency to screen the poor from the nonpoor;  (2) it issues food stamps only to the poor;
and (3) these food stamps are delivered at public health clinics, which rich households do
not tend to visit.
Replacing a general, self-targeted food subsidy program like the one in Egypt with
an administratively targeted, means-tested program like the one in Jamaica thus has the
potential for improving the delivery of food subsidy benefits to the poor.  However, such
a strategy must consider two possible difficulties.  First, to follow the Jamaican example
it will be necessary to establish an efficient administrative system for separating poor
from nonpoor households, and then ensuring that only the former receive subsidized foo,d.
Such an administrative system will have its own budgetary costs.  Second, in the Egyptian21
case nonpoor households which are now receiving food subsidies will need to be
excluded from this new administrative program.  Excluding such nonpoor households
may be politically difficult. In some cases,  narrowly focused, admLinistratively  targeted
food subsidy  programs  -- like the food stamps  program  in Jamaica  -- do not last long,
because they lack the political support of the excluded middle class.
Because of the political and administrative costs associated with shifting to an
administratively targeted food subsidy program, it is useful to consider several less
radical methods of reforming the Egyptian food subsidy system. Each of these possible
reforms seeks to reduce the fiscal costs of the present food subsidy system in Egypt.
In order to predict the distributional impact of these possible reforms, it is
necessary to estima,te  a complete matrix of food demand parameters for poor and nonpoor
income groups in urban and rural Egypt. This can be done by using a new "food
characteristic demand system" proposed by Bouis 33 mnd  applied to the Egyptian data set
by Bouis and Ahmed. 34 This new system uses a hedonic demand system to calculate a
comrplete  demand matrix of own-price, cross-price and expenditure elasticities for food
and nonfood goods under specific restrictive assumptions.
Expenditure elasticities generated by the food characteristic demand system for
15 foods are presented in Table 11. In this table expenditure elasticities are presented
separately for the poor (lowest 40 percent of the population in the policy simulations) and
for the nonpoor (top 60 percent of the population), eLnd  for urban and rural areas. In the
table subsidized and non-subsidized sugar, and subsidized and non-subsidized oil, are
treated as single, aggregate goods, because only a srmall  percentage of households in
urban and iural Egypt rely exclusively on purchases of these two subsidized goods.22
However, purchases of subsidized baladi bread and subsidized baladi wheat flour are not
restricted by quantity, and thus expenditure elasticities are estimated separately for these
two goods.
In Table l Ithe  expenditure elasticities for subsidized baladi bread and subsidized
baladi wheat flour are negative in most (but not all) cases, suggesting that these two foods
are inferior goods.  By contrast, the best quality bread - fino bread (72 percent extraction)
- has the highest expenditure elasticity among cereals in both urban and rural Egypt.
Using the expenditure elasticities in Table 11, 3 5 it is possible to calculate the
distributional effects of three types of reform in the Egyptian food subsidy system.
The first possible reform is to eliminate the current subsidy on edible oil. While
the edible oil subsidy presently only accounts for about 15 percent of the cost of total
food subsidies, the data suggest that edible oil accounts for less than 4 percent of total per
capita calorie availability in urban and rural Egypt. Moreover, the mean per capita level
expenditures on edible oil in both urban and rural Egypt is essentially flat across income
groups, suggesting that this food is probably not an inferior good. Policy simulations
based upon the food characteristic demand system suggest that eliminating the subsidy on
oil would cause an 11 percent decline in the value of income transfers to the urban poor
in Egypt, and a 14 percent decline in the value of such transfers to the rural poor.
The second possible reform is to eliminate the current subsidy on sugar.  At
present, the subsidy on sugar accounts for 18 percent of the cost of total food subsidies..
Moreover, like oil, sugar accounts for a very small share -- about 3 percent -- of total per
capita calorie availability in urban and rural Egypt. Policy simulations show that
eliminating this subsidy would lead to an 11 percent decline in the value of income23
transfers to the urban poor in Egypt, and a 19 percent decline in the value of such
transfers for the rural poor.  In other words, eliminating the subsidy on sugar would have
just about the sanie impact on the poor as that of eliminating the subsidy on oil.
The third possible reform, doubling the price of a loaf of subsidized baladi bread
from LE 0.05 to ILE  0.10,36  would have the most iraportant economic and distributional
effects on the poor in Egypt.  On the one hand, simulations based upon the food
characteristic 'demand system suggest that government costs on total food subsidies would
decline by 47 percent.  On the other hand, because consumption of baladi bread is so high
for the poor in urban areas, a doubling of the price of subsidized baladi bread would lead
to a 61 percent decline in the value of income transfers to the urban poor.  As a result of
this large decline, there would be a significant negative effect on urban incomes:
simulationLs  suggest that total nonfood expenditures in urban areas would fall by
approximately 7 percent. In rural areas, the food consumption and income effects of such
an increase in subsidized baladi bread prices would be smaller, because rural people
consume less subsidized bread than their urban counterparts.
8. Conclusion
In the past, the ability of the Egyptian food subsidy system to target and improve
the welfare and nutritional status of the poor in Egypt has been much-debated. This
debate has taken place because the Egyptian food subsidy system is still a general,
untargeted program that is essentially open to all Egyptians, poor and non-poor.
This paper has used new household survey data to show that the Egyptian food
subsidy system is targeted in the sense of being self-targeted to the poor because it24
subsidizes foods which have the characteristics of inferior goods. This finding is
particularly true in urban Egypt. In urban areas the food subsidy system is dominated by
one food - coarse baladi bread - which is consumed more in absolute and relative terms
by the poor (lowest quintile group) than by the rich (highest quintile group). As a result
of the choice of foods to be subsidized, in urban areas the poor receive more income
transfers from food subsidies than the rich. In rural areas, however, the food subsidy
system is not quite as well targeted to the poor. In rural Egypt baladi bread is not an
inferior good; the only subsidized food which is consumed more in absolute terms by the
poor in the countryside is baladi wheat flour.  While income transfers from baladi wheat
flour benefit the poor more than the rich, for the food subsidy system as a whole in rural
Egypt, the poor receive slightly less in income transfers in absolute terms than the rich.
Experience with food subsidy systems in other countries suggests that subsidy
programs which use administrative targeting can do an even better job of delivering
benefits to the poor.  For example, the food subsidy program in Jamaica, which uses
administrative targeting to deliver food stamps to poor people at health clinics, delivers
over twice the amount of income transfers to the lowest quintile group than the present
program in Egypt (see Table 10 (b)).
However, in order to implement the Jamaican food subsidy program in Egypt it
would be necessary to establish a new government agency for separating the poor (lowest
quintile group) from the nonpoor, and then ensuring that only the former receive
subsidized food.  Creating such an administrative agency would have its own budgetary
and - even more importantly - political costs.  In particular, it would be politically25
difficult to exclude the large number of nonpoor households which now receive some
benefit fronm  the Egyptian food subsidy system.
Ever since the food riots of 1977, Egyptian policymakers have been reluctant to
make sudden and large-scale changes in the food subsidy system.  Instead, the strategy
has been to try to reduce the costs and coverage of this system gradually. For example,
since 1980 policyrnakers have reduced the number of subsidized foods from 20 to just
four, and have reduced the number of kinds of subsidized bread from 3 to just one.  In the
future, it seems likely that policymakers will continue on this same track, and efforts to
reform the system are likely to focus on eliminating the present subsidies for either
subsidized sugar or edible oil.  Neither of these subsidized foods is an inferior good, and
thus eliminating the subsidy on one or both foods will have only a minimal welfare and
nutritional impact on the poor in Egypt.Notes
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Table 1. Total cost by commodity of Egypt's food subsidy system, 1970 to 1996-97
Food  subsidies  as
Bread  and  Edible  Other  Total  Food  Total  food  percentage  of  total
Year  wheat  flour  Maize  oils  Sugar  commodities*  subsidies**  subsidies*-*  govt.  expendibtre
LE  Million  LE  Million  Percentage
(Nominal  Terms)  (Real  Terms)
1970/71  20.9  0.8  10.4  8.0  1.7  41.8  0.2
1972  15.1  0.4  15.8  6.0  4.6  41.9  0.7
1973  79.0  4.4  16.8  19.0  17.0  136.2  5.5
1974  216.0  16.5  55.3  68.9  36.5  393.2  16.5
1975  260.9  31.1  72.2  20.8  38.7  423.7  16.9
1976  171.6  23.1  43.2  6.1  37.4  281.4  9.8
1977  149.1  406.0  54.6  n.a.  n.a.  343.2  10.9
1978  222.8  53.8  137.4  n.a.  n.a.  452.4  11.9
1979  588.3  38.5  200.2  n.a.  n.a.  996.8  16.2
1980-81  511.0  63.7  125.4  97.8  296.4  1094.3  2918.1  16.9
1981-82  807.1  160.1  259.7  169.3  431.8  1828.0  4415.5  19.5
1982-83  758.0  199.1  201.5  133.7  414.7  1707.0  3586.1  14.3
1983-84  861.5  294.1  337.5  119.5  396.4  2009.0  3639.5  16.8
1984-85  614.7  264.0  395.3  134.3  1037.7  2446.0  3786.4  18.4
1985-86  448.7  310.3  331.5  195.7  695.8  1982.0  2707.7  12.3
1986-87  289.8  136.1  263.6  258.5  723.0  1671.0  1671.0  10.6
1987-88  235.6  8.7  204.5  341.8  550.4  1341.0  1248.6  6.8
1988-89  543.3  - 243.5  470.4  737.8  1995.0  1578.3  9.2
1989-90  615.4  - 245.2  643.8  242.6  1747.0  1139.6  7.1
1990-91  1255.0  - 368.0  600.0  177.0  2400.0  1162.0  7.4
1991-92  1057.0  - 629.0  698.0  98.0  2482.0  1158.2  5.0
1992-93  1308.0  - 542.3  600.4  (-0.7)  2450.0  1040.8  5.5
1993-94  1424.0  - 424.9  579.7  57.4  2486.0  918.7  5.3
1994-95  1486.0  - 433.0  573.0  - 2492.0  865.6  5.4
1995-96  1848.1  625.0  624.9  3098.0  1059.0  6.0
1996-97  2273.0  606.2  788.8  3668.0  1244.0  6.5
*Other  commodities  include  rice, lentils,  chicken,  frozen  fish and  frozen  meat.
**Total  food  subsidies  include  financial  losses  of food marketing  companies.
***Total  food  subsidies  in real  terms  calculated  by deflating  nominal  costs  by CAPMAS  Consumer  Price
Index  for urban  areas  (1  986-87  = 100).
n.a.  = Not  available.
Sources:  Food  subsidy  data:
1970-71  to 1980-81  from Harold  Alderman,  Joachim  von Braun  and Sakr  A. Sakr,  Egypt's  Food  Subsidy  and
Rationing  System: A Description,  Research  Report  34 (Washington,  DC:  International  Food  Policy  Research
Institute,  1982),  Table  2.
1981-82  to 1996-97  from unpublished  data,  Ministry  of Planning,  and Ministry  of Trade and  Supply.
Total  government  expenditure  data:
1970-71  to 1979  from Alderman,  von Braun  and Sakr,  op. cit.
1980-81  to 1991-92  from unpublished  data,  Central  Agency  for Public  Mobilization  and Statistics.
1992-93  to 1996-97  from unpublished  data,  Ministry  of Trade  and Supply.31
Table  2.  Estimated  costs  of Egypt's  explicit  and  implicit  subsidies,  1990/91  to 1995/96  (in LE millions)  (nominal  terms)
1990/91  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96
Explicit  Subsidies
Food  2,400  2,482  2,450  2,486  2,492  3,099
Transportation'  ---  ---  ---  326  301
Total2  6,000  7,600  4,000  3,500  3,700  4,200
Implicit  Subsidies
Water 3 ---  700  800  950
Electricity 4 ---  3,100  3,200  3,000
Oil products  ---  ---  ---  ---
Total 5 3,800  4,000  3,950
Notes  and  sources:
1/ Transportation  subsidies  are incomplete  and  are based  only  on subsidies  to Cairo  and Alexandria  Transportation  Authorities.
Value of  other transportation  subsidies  is unknown. All estimates  by International  Monetary  Fund.
2/ Value of food  and transportation  subsidies  does  not sum  to total explicit  subsidies  because  of inGcompieie  daia. Toiai expli,ct  subusiudies
estimated  by International  Monetary  Fund.
3/ Water  subsidies,  based  on operational  and investment  subsidies  for piped  water  in Cairo  and  Alexandria,  estimated  by vvorld  Bank,
Arab  Republic  of Egypt:  Social  Welfare  Study  (Strenathening  the Social  Safety  Net)  (Washington,  DC: World  Bank, 1995),  p.17.
Estimates  do  not include  value of  water subsidies  to rural  farmers.
4/  Electricity  subsidies,  measured  as the difference  between  current  yield  and long-run  marginal  cost, estimated  by World Bank,  Arab
Republic  of Egypt:  Social  Welfare  Study (Strengthening  the Social  Safety  Net) (Washington,  DC: World Bank, 1995),  p.18.
5/ Total implicit  subsidies  calculated  as sum of all implicit  subsidies.32
Table  3. Expenditures  on subsidized  food by expenditure  quintile  group  in urban Egypt,  1997
Mean  per capita  expenditures  per week (in LE)a  on  subsidized  food by:
Lowest  Highest
Quintile  Second  Third  Fourth  Quintile
Subsidized  food  [1]  [21  [3]  [4]  [5]  Average
Baladi  bread  0.96  0.94  0.95  0.86  0.73*  0.88
Baladi  wheatflour  0.10  0.13  0.12  0.06  0.09  0.10
Edible  oil  0.08  0.10  0.12  0.09  0.07  0.09
Sugarb  0.08  0.09  0.11  0.10  0.10  0.10
Total  expenditures  on subsidized
food byquintile  1.22  1.26  1.30  1.11  0.99  1.17
Percent  of total expenditures
on  subsidized  food by quintile  20.75  21.43  22.11  18.88  16.83  100.00
Percent  of total  population
in quintile  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  100.00
Source: IFPRI  Egypt  Integrated  Household  Survey,  1997.
Notes: N = 1,078. Urban  population  is divided  into quintile  groups  on the basis  of total per
capita  fitted  expenditures.
a In 1997,1 Egyptian  pound  (LE) = US$0.295.  All  expenditure  figures  are in nominal  terms.
b Includes  expenditures  on fully  and partially  subsidized  sugar.
Difference  between  lowest  and highest  quintile  groups  is significant  at the  0.05 level.33
Table  4. Rates  of subsidy  for subsidized  food  in Egypt,  1991/92  to 1996/9,7
1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97
Subsidized  food  (in  percent)
Baladi  bread (loaf)  55  52  51  55  63  59
Baladi  wheat
flour (100 kg)  40  36  34  40  53  47
Edible  oil (0.5 kg)  50  48  51  50  61  56
Sugar  (1kg)  59  58  56  53  64  62
Notes;  Rate  of subsidy-:Amount  of income  transfer/"Free  Market",  nonsubsidized  price
Subsidized  baladi  bread  is sold  by the loaf;  subsidized  baladi  wheat  flour is sold by 100 kilogram
sacks;  subsidized  edible  oil is sold  on a ration  basis  at 0.5 kilograms  per month;  and  subsidized
sugar  is sold  on  a ration basis  at 1.0  kilograms  per month.
Source: Calculated  froim  unpublished  data,  Ministry  of Trade  and  SJpply34
Table  5. Income  transfers  to urban  consumers  from subsidized  food by expenditure  quintile  group,  1997
Mean  per capita  income  transfers  from subsidized  food received
by: (in LEa  per capita  per week)
Lowest  Highest
Quintile  Second  Third  Fourth  Quintile
Subsidized  food  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [51  All
Baladi  bread  1.36  1.33  1.35  1.22  1.04*  1.26
Baladi  wheat  flour  0.10  0.14  0.11  0.07  0.08  0.10
Edible  oil  0.16  0.20  0.27  0.24  0.18  0.21
Sugarb  0.21  0.17  0.24  0.22  0.30  0.23
Total  income  transfers
from  subsidized  food  1.83  1.85  1.96  1.75  1.60  1.79
Total  income  transfers  from
subsidized  food  as percent  of
total per capita  expenditures  8.74  6.20  4.81  3.10  1.43  3.12
Mean  total  per capita
expenditures  per week  (on all
food and  nonfood  items)  20.94  29.78  40.78  56.19  112.00  57.38
Source: IFPRI  Egypt  Integrated  Household  Survey,  1997.
Notes: N = 1,078. Urban  population  is divided  into  quintile  groups  on the basis  of total  per
capita  fitted  expenditures.
a  In 1997,1 Egyptian  pound  (LE) = US$0.295.  All expenditure  figures  are in nominal  terms.
b Includes  expenditures  on  fully and partially  subsidized  sugar.
Difference  between  lowest  and  highest  quintile  groups  is significant  at the 0.05  level.35
Table  6. Subsidized  food  as a source  of  calorie  availability  by expenditure  quintile  group
for urban  Egypt,  1997
Percent  of  lotal daily per capita  calorie
availability  by ?er  capita  expenditure  quintile
Lowest  Second  *rhird  Fourth  Highest
Subsidized  food  '[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  All
Baladi  bread  33.0  29.2  26.3  22.7  18.1  25.0
Baladi  wheat  flour  3.1  3.9  2.5  1.2  1.4  2.3
Edible  oil  3.7  4.2  4.4  3.4  2.5  3.5
Sugar  3.6  3.2  3.2  2.8  2.6  3.0
Percent  of  total daily  per capita  calorie
availability  from subsidized  food  43.5  40.4  36.4  30.0  24.6  33.8
Total daily  per  capita  calorie  availability  2,704  3,012  3,302  3,533  3,664  3,306
Source: IFPRI  Egypt  Integrated  Household  Survey,  1997.
Notes:  N = 1,078. Urban  population  is divided  into  quintile  groups  on  the basis  of total per
capita  fitted expenditures.36
Table  7. Expenditures  on subsidized  food  by expenditure  quintile  group  in rural Egypt,  1997
Mean  per capita  expenditures  (in LE)a
on subsidized  food per week  by:
Lowest  Highest
Quintile  Second  Third  Fourth  Quintile
Subsidized  food  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  Average
Baladi  bread  0.42  0.44  0.48  0.54  0.54  0.49
Baladi  wheat  flour  0.64  0.54  0.52  0.54  0.53  0.55
Edible  oil  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.09
Sugarb  0.07  0.09  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.10
Total  expenditures  on subsidized
food by  quintile  1.19  1.15  1.19  1.28  1.28  1.23
Percent  of total  expenditures  on
subsidized  food by quintile  19.54  18.88  19.54  21.02  21.02  100.00
Percent  of total population  in quintile  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.00  100.00
Source: IFPRI  Egypt  Integrated  Household  Survey,  1997.
Notes: N = 1,278. Rural  population  is divided  into  quintile  groups  on the basis  of total per capita
fitted expenditures.
a  In 1997,  1 Egyptian  pound  (LE)  = US$0.295.  All expenditure  figures are in nominal  terms.
b  Includes  expenditures  on fully and  partially  subsidized  sugar.37
Table 8.  Income transfiers to rural consumers from subsidized food by expenditure quintile group, 1997
Mean per capita income transfers from subsidized food received
by: (in LEa  per capita per week)
Lowest  Highest
Quintile  Second  Third  Fourth  Quintile
Subsidized food  [1  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  All
Baladi bread  0.59  0.62  0.68  0.77  0.84*  0.70
Baladi wheat flour  0.64  0.57  0.45  0.65  0.46*  0.55
Edible oil  0.17  0.20  0.20  0.:23  0.26  0.21
Sugarb  0.22  0.17  0.24  0.:22  0.30  0.23
Total income transfers from
subsidized food  1.62  1.57  1.58  1.87  1.86  1.70
Total income transfers from
subsidized food as pearcent  olf
total per capita expernditures  10.43  7.68  6.17  5.77  3.39  5.26
Mean total per capita
expenditures per week (on all
food and nonfood iterns)  15.51  20.47  25.60  32.39  54.85  32.29
Source:  IFPRI Egypt Integnrated  Household Survey, 1997.
Notes:  N = 1,274.  Rural population is divided into quintile groups o0 the basis of total per
capita fitted expenditures.
a  In 1997, 1 Egyptian pound (LE) = US$0.295. All expenditure figures are in nominal terms.
b Includes expenditures on fully and partially subsidized sugar.
Difference between lowest and highest quintile groups is significant at the 0.05 level.38
Table 9.  Subsidized food as a source of calorie availability by expenditure quintile group for rural
Egypt, 1997
Percent of total daily per capita calorie
availability, by per capita expenditure quintile
Lowest  Second  Third  Fourth  Highest
Subsidized food  [11  [21  [3]  [4]  [51  All
Baladi bread  15.6  13.5  13.2  14.6  13.3  13.9
Baladi wheat flour  16.4  13.0  11.5  11.2  9.8  12.0
Edible oil  2.7  2.6  2.8  3.0  2.7  2.8
Sugar  3.1  3.2  3.0  3.1  2.7  3.0
Percent of total daily per capita
calorie availability from subsidized food  37.9  32.4  30.5  31.8  28.5  31.6
Total daily per capita calorie availability  2,874  3,058  3,543  3,653  4,194  3,555
Source: IFPRI Egypt Integrated Household Survey, 1997.
Notes: N = 1,274. Rural population is divided into quintile groups on the basis of total per capita fitted
expenditures.39
Table 10. An internaticinal  comparison  of the income  transfers  from Egyptian  food  subsidies  with  those  of
food subsidy  programs  in other  countries
Percent  of I  icome Transfers  Going  to Quintile  Group
Poor  Rich
Country  Program  1  2  3  4  5
(a) Self-tarpeted  proarams
Egypt  (1997)  SELF-SELECTION:  Baladi  bread
Urban  and  wheat  flour,  edi"ble  oil,  and sugar  20  21  22  19  18
Egypt  (1997)  SELF-SELECTION:  Baladi  bread
Rural  and  wheatflour,  edi,ble  oil,  and sugar  19  18  19  22  22
Tunisia  (1993)  SELF-SELECTION:  Food  price
subsidies,  food  quality  differentiation  21  20  21  20  18
Morocco  (1991)  SELF-SELECTION:  Food  price
subsidies,  high  extraction  rate  flour  23  24  22  18  13
(b)  Administratively  targeted  proarams
Jamaica  Food  starnps  at health  clinic  44  31  18  5  2
Chile  Food  supplement  a-t  health  clinic  41  28  18  10  3
Peru  Food  supplement  by neighborhood  42  30  20  6  3
Source: Egypt  figures  are calculated  from Table  5 and 8; all other  data  from Laura ruck and Kathy  Lindert,  From  Universal
Food  Subsidies  to a Self-Taraeted  Program:  A Case  Study  of Tunisian  Reform,  Wcrld Bank  Discussion  Paper  351
(Washington,  DC: World  Bank,  1996),  Table  20.40
Table I1. Expenditure  elasticities  for 15  subsidized  and  nonsubsidized  foods
in urban  and rural Egypt,  1997
Expenditure  elasticities
Urban  Rural
Food  Lower  Upper  Lower  Upper
40  60  40  60
percent  of  percent  of  percent  of  percent  of
population  population  population  population
Subsidized  foods
Baladi  bread  -0.11  -0.25  -0.05  -0.16
Baladi  wheat  flour  -0.08  0.05  0.04  -0.09
Nonsubsidized  foods
Wheat  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.06
Fino  bread  0.35  0.16  0.34  0.17
Rice  0.05  -0.02  -0.20  0.10
Other  cereal  0.21  0.13  0.16  0.11
Oil  0.62  0.42  0.71  0.49
Sugar  0.55  0.45  0.63  0.48
Pulses  0.48  0.29  0.54  0.37
Vegetables  0.73  0.56  0.74  0.58
Fruits  0.73  0.56  0.73  0.58
Meat  0.86  0.63  0.93  0.68
Eggs,  milk  0.77  0.57  0.83  0.60
Condiments  0.80  0.59  0.83  0.63
Beverages  0.90  0.66  0.96  0.72
Nonfoods
Nonfoods  1.60  1.42  1.71  1.53
Source: Howarth  Bouis  and  Akhter  Ahmed,  "The Egyptian  Food  Subsidy  System: Impacts
on  the Poor  and  an Evaluation  of Alternatives  for Policy  Reforms",  (Washington,  DC:
International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute,  1998),  Table  15.41
Appendix  Table  1. Calculation  of  rate of subsidy  on subsidized  baladi  bread (82 percent  extraction)  in Egypt,  1996/97
Cell references  1996/97
Pro  nto-+  -th:heat  rr.1n) I.......  L  I  "'tf  ILgrI  aL  4  inI*
Border  CIF price  (Egypt  LE/ton)  (1)  694
Import  charges  (port  charges,  handling,  etc.,)  (2)  20
import  procurement  cost-price  (Egypt  LEi/ton)  (3) = (1) + (2)  714
Domestic  procurement  price  (Egypt  LE/ton)  (4)  600
Collection.  storage  and  transport  (wheat  grain)
Import  procurement  price  of grain  (per  ton)  (5) = (3)  714
Collection,  storage  and  transport  margin  (6)  20
Explicit  subsidy  at CS&T  level  (7)  0
Grain sales price (per ton)  (8) = (5) + (6)  734
Milling  (conversion  from wheat  grain  to  flour)
Mill  purchase  price  of grain  (per  ton of grain)  (9) = (8)  734
Mill  purchase  price  in flour  equivalent  (per  ton  of flour)  (10)  = (9)/CF  895
IVmlgll  in  Illdgylll (Per IUI  Ulo  IIoUfU  I  I)  40
Explicit  subsidy  at milling  level  (12)  0
F..  IA11=IAf%  IA  A  I  Ex-mi,l sales price  (pertLon ofl  l'our')  (I)  =  lU)  +  1 1)  935
Retail-bakeries  (flour  to bread)
Subsidized  sales  price to bakeries  (per  ton  of flour)  (14)  290
Retail  margin  at bakeries  (including  transport)  (15)  160
Subsidized  sales  price to consumers  (16) = (15) + (14)  450
Explicit subsidy at bakery (per ton of flour)  (17) = [(13) + (15)] - (16)  645
(Continued)42
Appendix  Table  1. Continued
Cell references  1996/97
Policy Analysis - Consumers
Subsidized  purchase  price  by consumers  (18)  = (16)  450
(per ton  of flour)
Income  transfer  to consumers  (19)  = (17)  645
(Egypt  LE/ton)
Rate  of subsidy  to consumers  (percent)  (20)  = (19)/[(13)  + (15)]  58.9
(Income  transfer  to consumers  divided
by free market,  non-subsidized  price)
Notes: All  figures  in Egypt  LE/ton,  unless  otherwise  noted. In 1997  1 Egyptian  LE = US  $ 0.295.
CIF = Cost,  insurance  and  freight
CS&T  = Collection,  storage  and transport
CF = Conversion  factor  for wheat  grain  into flour;  for subsidized  baladi  bread  this ratio  is 82 percent.
Sources:  Border  CIF  price computed  as sum of average  export  price  for US  No.2  Hard Red  Winter  Wheat  and
freight  rate  from US  Gulf  to Alexandria,  Egypt  (International  Grains  Council,  World Grain  Statistics  1996/97,
London,  England:  Tables  1 and  42).
All  other data  from unpublished  data,  Ministry  of Trade  and Supply.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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